In the News-Blair/Bush/Iraq

With Thursday's national elections looming, and doubts about Tony Blair's trustworthiness a growing campaign issue, damning new evidence has emerged showing that the British prime minister knew, almost eight months before the invasion of Iraq, that the United Kingdom's involvement in the U.S.-led attack could have been illegal. Nevertheless, he pressed ahead with his intention to go to battle alongside the United States.

On Sunday, The Times published the full text of a secret document written by a foreign-policy aide in Blair's office containing a summary of a meeting of the prime minister with his foreign secretary, the attorney general and senior defense staffers. Dated July 23, 2002, the document clearly noted that George W. Bush had already "made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbors, and his capability [concerning weapons of mass destruction] was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran."

With this in mind, the minutes of the July 2002 meeting also stated that Britain's attorney general, Lord Goldsmith, had advised Blair that "the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action" but that there were "three possible legal bases" that could legitimize such an action, including "self-defense, humanitarian intervention or [United Nations Security Council] authorization." (None really applied to the U.K. at the time, and Blair's government knew it.) The written summary of the meeting concluded, "We must not ignore the legal issues."

However, the minutes of the July 2002 meeting summarize the British leader as saying, "If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work."

Now, with the election just days away, Blair, who is seeking a third term, is facing what his critics are calling a referendum on his trustworthiness and on his stubbornly pro-Washington stance on Iraq. Some of the prime minister's detractors -- like Conservative Party leader Michael Howard, his main rival -- have dared to claim that Blair lied to the British people in the run-up to the war in the reasons he offered for sending British troops into battle. (Times)

Booed when he stepped onstage during a campaign appearance last week, Blair "left the tight arena with further cries of 'liar' ringing in his ears." A member of a BBC production team present at the event said Blair "just looked shocked. Shell shocked." (Scotsman)

Charles Kennedy, leader of the Liberal Democrats, Britain's third major political party, told a campaign rally this past weekend, "Tony Blair's authority is seriously undermined by Iraq. Even if he wins a third term, he is now going to be a lame duck prime minister. Iraq will haunt his premiership and his legacy ...." (Independent)

http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/gate/archive/2005/05/03/worldviews.DTL&type=printable
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THE MEMO:

May 01, 2005
The secret Downing Street memo
NI_MPU('middle');
::nobreak::SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY

DAVID MANNING From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002S 195 /02
cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell

IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY

Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.

This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.

John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.

C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.

CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.

The two broad US options were:
(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).

(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.

The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:
(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.
(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.
(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.

The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.

The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.

The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.

The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.

On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.

For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.

The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.

John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real.

The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.

Conclusions:
(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options.

(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.

(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.

(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.

He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.

(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.

(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.

(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)

MATTHEW RYCROFT
(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/printFriendly/0,,1-523-1593607-523,00.html